reason to ϕ is for it to be a premise of good reasoning towards ϕ-ing.
1 I explain and motivate this view in sections one and two. In section three, I introduce a problem that views of this sort face accommodating outweighed reasons and argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful. Sections four and five develop and defend an alternative solution, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. Section six concludes by drawing out some implications of the resulting view for the debate over pragmatic reasons and for one influential form of reductionism about the normative.
The Reasoning View
The aim of this section is to explain how I shall understand the claim that reasons are premises of good reasoning. I begin with the notion of reasoning.
Reasoning is often, and naturally, understood narrowly -restricted, perhaps, to conscious processes, or ones undertaken intentionally, or which involve some kind of calculation. Under any of these restrictions, I may engage in reasoning when I calculate a tip in a restaurant, or try to figure out how to organise my day, but not when I unreflectively form the intention to turn right upon seeing the sign, or realise with a start that it is my brother's birthday on reading the calendar. However, it is also possible to understand reasoning in a broader way, under which these latter transitions do count as reasoning. In the most general sense, any psychological process by which we come to form, revise, or sustain an attitude for a reason -because of or in light of some consideration -counts as reasoning. In the examples above, I intend to turn right because that is the way home, and believe that today is my brother's birthday because today is the 19 th . I therefore count as reasoning in this broader sense. Note also that in this sense, we need not be puzzled by the Aristotelian claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. It is not controversial that actions can be done for reasons.
If reasoning is understood in this broad way, then to say that reasons are premises of good reasoning is to say that a reason is a suitable thing to have as one's reason -as the consideration in light of which one acts, believes, desires, or otherwise responds. This claim has the air of circularity. But the apparent problem here results from the ambiguity of 'reason'. To disambiguate: the claim of the reasoning view is that a normative reason is a suitable thing to have as one's motivating reason -as the consideration in light of which one responds. This claim is circular only if the property of being that in light of which one responds must be understood in terms of the property of being a reason to respond. But we need not accept this. It is possible, indeed common, to act or believe in light of a consideration which is not a normative reason. Nor need you believe that a consideration is a normative reason in order to respond in light of it.
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Reasoning falls into patterns. Some of these patterns, such as those which constitute affirming the consequent, or the gambler's fallacy, are examples of bad or mistaken reasoning. Others are examples of correct or, as I shall say, good reasoning.
We can represent two relatively uncontroversial examples of good reasoning as follows:
Belief that p, Belief that if p then q ⇒ Belief that q
Intention to φ, Belief that ψ -ing is the only way to φ ⇒ Intention to ψ
We can read these claims as saying that it is good reasoning to move from the states mentioned on the left-hand side of the arrow to the state on the right-hand side. When this is true this move is a good pattern of reasoning. The states on the left-hand side of such a claim are the premise-responses of that pattern; the state on the right-hand side is the conclusion-response. The contents of the beliefs among the premiseresponses are the premises of that pattern -they are the considerations in light of which an agent acts, believes, or otherwise responds.
On the view to be developed here, it is a necessary condition of a consideration's being a reason for an agent to φ that there is a good pattern of reasoning from a set of psychological states, including belief in that consideration, to φ-ing. This is not, however, a sufficient condition. To start with, patterns of good reasoning are abstract structures. To give an account of what it is for a consideration to be a reason for an agent, we must relate the pattern of reasoning which corresponds to that consideration to that agent's psychology. The simplest way to do this would be to require that the agent has the premise-states of that pattern. However, this approach would commit us to the controversial claim that a consideration can be a reason for an agent only if that agent believes that consideration to obtain. To avoid this implication, we can require instead that the agent has any non-doxastic states among the premise-states of the relevant pattern. On this approach, the second of the patterns above corresponds to a reason for you to ψ only if you intend to φ. But it is not required that you believe that ψ-ing is the only way to φ (cf. Setiya 2007: 11-13 The simplest move here would be to require that the beliefs involved in an agent's reasoning are true (Setiya 2007: 12 Kearns and Star (2009, esp. 219-22) , Schroeder (2007 : 113, n.16, 2008 : 70), Finlay 2006 position, and we can ask about whether reasons have to conform to principles. What's more it is plausible -at least as a default presumption -that we should expect the same answers in each case. to move from the utility of φ-ing to φ-ing but not good reasoning to move from the utility of believing p to believing p. If so, the reasoning view will tell us that utility provides reasons for action but not belief. So while the reasoning view offers unity at one level, it is quite compatible with diversity at another level.
9 I say more about this with respect to the question about principles in Way 2013a and with respect to the question about epistemic positions in Way 2013b.
The second central attraction of the reasoning view is that it captures with ease the very plausible thought with which we began -that reasons to φ must be appropriate premises of reasoning towards φ-ing. On the reasoning view, this thought is a simple consequence of the nature of reasons.
It is instructive here to contrast the reasoning view with an alternative.
Consider the 'primitivist' view of Jonathan Dancy (2004) , Derek Parfit (2011a, b) , and T.M. Scanlon (1998), on which reasons to ϕ are simply considerations which count in favour of ϕ-ing. The prima facie problem for this view is that not all considerations which count in favour of some response seem to be suitable premises for reasoning towards that response. Consider so-called pragmatic or 'wrong kind'
reasons: that believing in God would make you happy, or that intending to drink an unpleasant but otherwise harmless toxin will earn you $1m. Since the prospect of happiness clearly counts in favour of believing that God exists, and the $1m prize clearly counts in favour of intending to drink the toxin, the primitivist should count these considerations as reasons to believe that God exists and to intend to drink the toxin. 10 But it is equally clear that these considerations are not appropriate premises of reasoning to the belief that God exists or to the intention to drink the toxin. The transitions of thought you would express to yourself by saying 'believing that God exists would make me happy, so, God exists' or 'intending to drink the toxin would make me rich, so, I shall drink the toxin' are bad pieces of reasoning, if they count as reasoning at all. The primitivist view is thus in prima facie tension with the plausible thought that reasons to φ must be appropriate premises of reasoning towards φ-ing.
By contrast, the reasoning view supports and explains this claim.
The third central attraction of the reasoning view is that it offers a simple explanation of a notable restriction on reasons. While there are normative reasons for action, belief, and desire, there are no normative reasons for perceptual experiences, or for your hair to be turquoise, or for you to be a little bit taller (cf. Scanlon 1998: 20). More generally, there are normative reasons only for things which can be done or had for reasons. This fact is a straightforward consequence of the reasoning view. For while actions, beliefs, and desires can be conclusions of reasoning, in our broad sense, perceptual experiences, the colour of your hair, and your height, cannot.
Again, it is useful here to contrast the reasoning view with a rival. According to value-based views, reasons are considerations which make a response good in some way.
The Problem of Outweighed Reasons and Two Solutions
The reasoning view, as developed in R1, thus has several important attractions.
However, it also faces a serious problem.
A central fact about normative reasons is that they can be outweighed. To say that you have some reason to φ does not imply that you have most or even sufficient reason to φ. It implies only that there is something to be said for φ-ing -something which may be outweighed, or perhaps defeated in other ways, by competing considerations.
This point is perhaps most widely acknowledged in the literature on reasons to act. Thus to adapt a famous example from Ross (1930: 18) , the fact that you have promised to meet a friend for lunch may be a reason to meet your friend even if, because you could save a life by breaking your promise, you ought not meet your friend. But the same holds for reasons for belief, desire, and other attitudes as well.
For example, if Betty says that Billy spent the whole evening at home with her, then that is some reason to think that he did so. But if others claim to have seen Billy at the scene of the crime, then we might lack sufficient reason to think that Billy spent the night at home. And if some policy will promote equality, then, if egalitarians are right, there is some reason to want this policy to pass. But if the way in which this policy promotes equality is by making everyone as badly off as the worst-off -if it is a "leveling down" policy -then there is not -even egalitarians should admitsufficient reason to want this policy to pass.
R1 seems not to accommodate these observations. If p is a reason to φ, then R1 tells us that it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p, perhaps together with other relevant psychological states, to φ-ing. However, when a reason to φ is outweighed, it seems not to be good reasoning to move from that reason to φ-ing,
given the stronger conflicting reasons. In the examples above, it would be a mistake to move from the belief that you promised to keeping your promise, or from Betty's testimony to the belief that Billy stayed home that evening. (Equivalently, these considerations are not here suitable things to have as your reasons for keeping your promise, or believing that Billy stayed home that evening). These examples thus suggest is that it is good reasoning to move from belief that p to φ-ing only if p is a sufficient reason to φ. If that is right, then R1 fails as an account of reasons as such.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways for the reasoning view to respond to this problem. The first is to reject the counter-examples. A natural way to do this is to distinguish between good reasoning from certain of your attitudes and good reasoning given some further attitudes. Thus we might say that while it is indeed good reasoning to move from your belief that you promised to keeping your promise, it is not good reasoning to make this move given your further belief that by breaking your promise you can save a life. The thought here is that, just as reasons can be outweighed, good patterns of reasoning can be defeated. If we allow for good but defeasible patterns of reasoning, R1 can accommodate outweighed reasons.
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A second response to the problem is to revise the reasoning view. This is the standard way in which proponents of the reasoning view, and related views, have allowed for outweighed reasons. Consider Bernard Williams ' (1979; 1995; 2001) famous 'internal reasons' theory of practical reasons. According to a fairly standard formulation of this view, there is a reason for an agent to φ only if there is a 'sound deliberative route' from that agent's desires to a motivation to φ. This view allows for 12 A variant on this idea is to say that reasons are premises of reasoning which is good to some extent. On this view, when a reason is outweighed, the corresponding reasoning is not good overall. I am not sure that this suggestion differs substantively from that in the text. The discussion in §4 and §5 below could be taken as a way of spelling out the difference between pro tanto and overall good reasoning. Since it is possible to have conflicting desires about what to do -even given full information and correct deliberation -this view also has the structure to allow for outweighed reasons.
14 It is straightforward to incorporate these ideas into the formulation of the reasoning view presented here. Rather than saying that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning which concludes in φ-ing, we can say, following Smith, that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning which concludes in a desire to φ or, following
Williams, a motivation to φ. More generally, the standard solution to the problem of outweighed reasons takes reasons to φ to correspond to good reasoning which concludes in something weaker than, but importantly related to, φ-ing. Versions of the standard solution vary in what precisely they take this weaker thing to be.
13 For formulations along these lines, see Korsgaard 1986 : 19, Millgram 1996 : 198, and Parfit 2011b 269. On other formulations of Williams' view, the conclusion of the relevant reasoning is a desire to φ (Johnson 1999 : 53, Setiya 2011 
The Weaker Conclusion as Desire
The first version of the standard solution holds that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning which concludes in a desire to φ:
(R2) For the fact that p to be a reason for S to φ is for there to be a good pattern of reasoning from the belief that p, perhaps together with other correct attitudes which S has, to a desire to φ.
Talk of desires can be understood broadly or narrowly. On the narrow construal, all desires are desires to act. Putative desires for the weather to improve, for there to be life elsewhere in the universe, or for a certain number to be prime, are better understood as wishes or hopes. On the broad construal, no such restriction is in place -any sort of thing can be the object of desire. I shall argue that on either construal,
proponents of the reasoning view should be reluctant to adopt R2.
The problem with the narrow construal is clear. With desires understood in this way, R2 offers only an account of reasons to act, rather than a unified account of reasons. It thus lacks the first central attraction of the reasoning view.
The broad construal faces three problems. First, when understood in this way, R2 lacks the second central attraction of the reasoning view: it does not capture the plausible idea that reasons to φ must be appropriate premises of reasoning towards φ-ing. R2 tells us that reasons to φ are appropriate premises of reasoning which concludes in a desire to φ. But to reason to a desire for a belief, or a desire for an intention, is not necessarily to reason towards that belief or intention. It is not good reasoning to move from a desire for a belief to that belief.
Second, R2 also lacks the third central attraction of the reasoning view -it offers no straightforward explanation of why only things which can be done for reasons are subject to reasons. Since it can be good reasoning to move to a desire (in the broad sense) for a perceptual experience, or for turquoise hair, or to be a little bit taller, the view allows for reasons for such states. To avoid this consequence, R2 must appeal only to desires for things which can be had or done for reasons. However, if it is merely asserted that it is only such desires which are relevant, then the restriction on reasons is stipulated, rather than explained. R2 is thus in much the same position as the value-based view, when it comes to this restriction. R2 thus fails whether we construe desires broadly or narrowly. The first version of the standard solution is unsatisfactory.
The Weaker Conclusion as Motivation
The second version of the standard solution holds that reasons are premises of good reasoning which concludes in motivation:
(R3) For the fact that p to be a reason for S to φ is for there to be a good pattern of reasoning from the belief that p, perhaps together with other correct attitudes which S has, to a motivation to φ.
This view retains two of the central attractions of the reasoning view. It allows that reasons to φ are appropriate premises of reasoning towards φ-ing, since to be motivated to φ is to move towards φ-ing. And since perceptual experiences and the colour of your hair cannot be the objects of motivation, the view explains why there can be no reasons for perceptual experiences or the colour of your hair. On the face of it though, the view does not retain the second attraction of the reasoning view. Given the natural assumption that only actions can be the objects of motivation, the view offers no account of reasons for belief, desire, and other attitudes.
This may be too quick. There is such a thing as being inclined to believewhen you are deliberating about what to believe, you might feel yourself pulled now one way, now the other. We might take such inclinations to be doxastic motivations.
Alternatively, we might follow Setiya's (2014: 234) suggestion that reasons to believe are premises of good reasoning which concludes in increased confidence. 18 Insofar as we take degrees of confidence to stand to belief as degrees of motivation stand to action, this may seem a sufficiently unified account.
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However, neither of these suggestions seem satisfactory. Consider a case in which you learn that p, which is a reason to believe q, but in which you are already warranted in being certain that q, or that q is false. In such a case, good reasoning does not require you to increase your confidence in q, or to feel some inclination to believe q -either because you are already fully confident that q, or because it is plain that the newly acquired reason to believe q is conclusively outweighed. Consider also cases in which you learn that p, which is a reason to believe q, but at the same time acquire stronger, or equally weighty, reasons not to believe q. Again, good reasoning does not require you to increase your confidence in q, or to feel an inclination to believe q.
Replies to these objections are possible. In the first sort of case, it might be suggested that p cannot be a reason to believe q if you are warranted in being certain that not-q. But while this has some plausibility, it cannot be applied to the opposite case -we can clearly gain further reasons for claims we are already right to be certain in. In the second sort of case, it might be said that although learning that p does not require you to increase your confidence that q, given the contrary reasons, it would require you to increase your confidence that q in other circumstances. However, on pain of circularity, defending this response would require specifying these other circumstances without reference to reasons. It is not clear that this could be done. And in any case, the well-known difficulties with explaining reasons in terms of the response we ought to make, or would be rational to make, in other circumstances, should make us wary of appealing to such counterfactuals in an account of reasons other, less familiar ways in which the standard solution might be developed.
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Nonetheless, the problems with R2 and R3 should also lead us to consider alternative ways to solve the problem of outweighed reasons. Above I noted that there are prospects for arguing that cases of outweighed reasons are not in fact counterexamples to the version of the reasoning view we began with, R1. In the next two sections, I develop and defend this response. If this response succeeds, exploration of further versions of the standard solution will be unnecessary.
Defeasible Patterns of Reasoning
In Ross's case, it seems not to be good reasoning to move from the belief that you promised to meet your friend to doing so, when you believe that you will thereby leave someone to die. Nor does it seem good reasoning to move from Betty's testimony to the belief that Billy stayed home that evening, when you know that others dispute this. If you reasoned in one of these ways, you would be making a mistake.
These claims seem to be counter-examples to R1. R1 tells us that when p is a reason to ϕ, there is a good pattern of reasoning from the belief that p (perhaps with other attitudes) to ϕ-ing. There is a good pattern of reasoning from the belief that p to ϕ-ing, I said, when it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing. So R1 implies that when p is an outweighed reason to ϕ, it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing. The cases seem to show that this is not so. 21 For instance, it might suggested that reasons to ϕ are premises of good reasoning which concludes in a disposition to ϕ, or in taking, treating, or placing weight on a consideration as a reason to ϕ. (For the latter notions, see, e.g. Scanlon 1998 , Schlosser 2012 , Bratman 1996 , Gibbard 1990 : 160-4, Schroeder 2007 : ch.7).
However, we need not accept this. What is clear is that in these cases you make a mistake in your reasoning. But we need not take the claim that it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing to imply that if you reason from the belief that p to ϕ-ing, you make no mistake in your reasoning. We can distinguish between the claim that it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing and the claim that it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing given further attitudes you might have. Given this distinction, the fact that it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing does not ensure that if you move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing, you make no mistake. For it might not be good reasoning to make this move given further attitudes you have.
The examples above can be taken to illustrate this distinction: although it is good reasoning to move from the belief that you promised to meet your friend to doing so, it is not good reasoning to make this move given the belief that you will thereby leave someone to die. But there are many other examples which also suggest that we need a distinction of this sort. The most familiar cases are induction and abduction. It is plausibly good reasoning to move from the belief that all observed Fs are Gs to the belief that the next F will be G. But it is not good reasoning to make this move given the further belief that conditions for observing Fs have been unrepresentative. Or consider the move from believing that the match was struck to believing that the match lit, or from believing that Tweety is a bird to believing that Tweety flies. These seem like good patterns of reasoning, corresponding to the defeasible generalisations that matches light when struck, and that birds fly. But it is not good reasoning to make these moves given the further beliefs that Tweety is a penguin (in the former case) or that the match was wet (in the latter). 22 Practical reasoning affords further examples still. For instance, although it is plausibly good reasoning to move from an intention for an end to an intention for what you take to be the best means to that end, it is not good reasoning to make this move when you know that taking this means will prevent you achieving other of your ends.
It might be objected that if it is not good reasoning to move from some premise-responses to a conclusion-response given some further attitudes then, if you have those further attitudes, we can infer that it is not good reasoning to move from those premise-responses to the conclusion-response. How could this inference fail? In response, I suggest that claims about good reasoning, and thus good patterns of reasoning, need not only concern transitions between premise-and conclusionresponses. Further relevant attitudes can also fall within the 'scope' of claims about good reasoning -we can make claims of the form: it is not good reasoning to [move from premise-responses P to conclusion-response C given further attitudes A]. It does not follow from a claim of this form that if you have the further attitudes A, then it is not good reasoning to move from P to C. And it is important that we allow claims about good reasoning to take this form. When assessing someone's reasoning we are not only interested in the considerations in light of which they reached their conclusion; we are also interested in the considerations which they may have ignored when doing so.
The distinction between good reasoning from some of your attitudes and good reasoning given further attitudes allows R1 to solve the problem of outweighed reasons. Say that the move from some premise-responses to a conclusion-response is a good but defeasible pattern of reasoning when it is good reasoning to move from 22 See Horty 2012, from whom I take the standard example of Tweety, and Pollock 1974 Pollock , 1987 for extended discussion of this kind of reasoning. I hope to consider the relationship between the notion of a defeasible pattern of reasoning and Horty's notion of a default rule elsewhere.
those premise-responses to that conclusion-response but not good reasoning to make this move given some further possible attitudes. Once we allow for such patterns of reasoning, R1 allows for outweighed reasons. R1 implies that when p is a reason to ϕ, there is a good pattern of reasoning from the belief that p (perhaps with other attitudes) to ϕ-ing. But since patterns of reasoning can be defeasible, it does not follow that it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to ϕ-ing given other attitudes you may have. The observations which give rise to the problem of outweighed reasons thus do not undermine R1. It doesn't follow from the observation that, given certain other attitudes, it may not be good reasoning to move from the belief that you promised to keeping your promise, or from someone's testimony to accepting that testimony, that the patterns of reasoning here are not good patterns of reasoning. All that follows is that these patterns are defeasible. What is it for one pattern of reasoning to defeat another? Roughly, I suggest that one pattern of reasoning defeats another if it is good reasoning to move from the premise-states of the one to its conclusion, given the premise-states of the other, but not vice-versa. Slightly more precisely, suppose R 1 is a good pattern of reasoning which concludes in φ-ing and R 2 is a good pattern of reasoning which concludes in a conflicting conclusion ψ. For R 1 to defeat R 2 is for it to be good reasoning to move from the premise-responses of R 1 to the conclusion-response of R 1 , given the premiseresponses of R 2 , but not good reasoning to move from the premise-responses of R 2 to the conclusion-response of R 2 , given the premise-responses of R 1 . 24 For example, in
The Weight of Reasons
Ross's case, it is not good reasoning to move from the belief that you promised to meet your friend to doing so, given the belief that you will thereby leave someone to die. But it is good reasoning to move from the belief that by staying here you can save a life to staying here, even given the belief that by doing so you will break a promise. This is what it is for the pattern of reasoning which concludes in saving the life to defeat the pattern concluding in keeping your promise, and so for the reason to save the life to outweigh the reason to keep the promise.
This account of what it is for a reason to be outweighed requires further elaboration and development. 25 Nonetheless, I take it to be enough to indicate that the standard solution is not the only way for the reasoning view to provide an account of the weights of reasons -the solution to the problem of outweighed reasons that I have recommended naturally suggests an alternative.
Conclusion and Implications
The reasoning view, as developed in R1, offers an attractive account of the nature of reasons. R1 provides a unified account of reasons, vindicates the compelling idea that reasons to φ must be appropriate premises for reasoning towards φ-ing, and offers a straightforward explanation of why only things which can be done for reasons are subject to reasons. And, as I have now argued, R1 can accommodate outweighed reasons, and suggests a natural view of the weights of reasons.
25 One important question is whether R1 can accommodate other ways in which it is often claimed that reasons can interact, besides being outweighed -for instance, being attenuated or disabled (cf. Dancy 2004 , Horty 2012 , Pollock 1974 , 1987 , and Schroeder 2011 . A reason to φ is attenuated if it is made weaker by a consideration which is not a reason not to φ. It is relatively straightforward for R1 to allow for this possibility. For even if p is a reason to φ, it may not be good reasoning to move from the belief that p to φ-ing given other attitudes, even if those other attitudes do not correspond to reasons not to φ. For instance, in Lehrer and Paxson's famous example (1969: 228; cf. Schroeder 2007: 93) , it is not good reasoning to move from the belief that the person you just saw steal a book looks like Tom Grabit to the belief that Tom Grabit stole the book, given the further belief that Tom Grabit has an identical twin. But it does not follow from this that the fact that Tom Grabit has an identical twin is a reason not to believe that he stole the book. Disabling is more challenging. A reason to φ is disabled when a consideration which would otherwise be a reason to φ is not, in this case, a reason to φ. R1 may seem to rule this possibility out. If it is good reasoning to move from the belief that p to φ-ing, then if p, the fact that p is a reason to φ -no further facts can 'disable' this reason. However, R1 can allow for some forms of disabling (cf. Setiya 2014: 226-8) . For instance, where a good pattern of reasoning includes more than one premise, the falsity of one premise will count as a disabler of the truths of the other premises. I grant though that R1 may not accommodate all putative cases of disabling. However, while I will have to leave discussion of this issue for another occasion, it is worth noting that this is a general problem for the reasoning view -it does not reveal any advantage the standard solution has over R1.
Of course, much more would need to be done for a full defence of R1. In addition to the issues about the weights of reasons just noted, more would need to be said about the notions of reasoning and correctness which are at the heart of the view, and there are further objections to the view to consider, and alternatives to compare it to. 26 Rather than pursue these issues here, I want to conclude by drawing out two ways in which the view bears on further issues in normative theory.
Pragmatic Reasons for Attitudes
Suppose that believing in God would make you happy or that intending to drink an unpleasant but otherwise harmless toxin would win you $1m. As we noted in section two, some accounts of reasons support the claim that these considerations are reasons to believe in God, and to intend to drink the toxin. And for some philosophers, it is clear that this is the right verdict. But for others, it is a mistake. Considerations of this sort are not, properly speaking, reasons to believe in God, or to intend to drink the toxin. Rather, they are only reasons to want or to bring about these attitudes. 27 R1
supports an argument for this latter view. A reason to believe in God must be a premise of good reasoning which concludes in the belief that God exists. And while the fact that believing in God would make you happy is a premise of good reasoning which concludes in wanting to believe in God and in bringing about this attitude, it is not a premise of good reasoning which concludes in belief in God. The reasoning you would express to yourself by saying 'Believing in God would make me happy, so God exists' is plainly bad reasoning. So R1 supports the claim that pragmatic considerations of this sort are not, properly speaking, reasons to believe or intend.
Rather, they are reasons to want or bring it about that you believe or intend.
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Ideal Agent Accounts of Reasons
Something like the reasoning view is often taken to support the idea that normative reasons can be reduced to the responses of an idealised agent (e.g. Smith 1994: ch.5).
The natural thought here is that if reasons are premises of good reasoning, we will be able to reduce reasons to the responses of an agent who is reasoning well. However, this thought rests on the assumption that agents who reason well will have some response corresponding to each of their reasons. And while versions of the reasoning view which adopt the standard solution support this assumption -for instance, on
Smith's view, agents who are reasoning well have some desire corresponding to each of their reasons -R1 does not. 29 If reasons correspond to defeasible patterns of reasoning, rather than requirements to respond in some way, then we should not expect our idealised selves to have some response corresponding to every reason. The view defended here thus undermines a crucial assumption of one influential form of reductionism about reasons.
30 28 The argument here draws a conclusion about reasons from a premise about good reasoning. It should be stressed that the reasoning view is not committed to the claim that the best or only way to discover what we have reason to do is by considering good reasoning (cf. Setiya 2007: 117) . Nonetheless, we may sometimes have clearer intuitions about good reasoning than about reasons. I take this to be an example of such a case.
